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Case Note
Tort Law—Who’s Really Who? Apportioning Liability of
Independent Contractors Who Work for Hospitals that Qualify for
Sovereign Immunity in a Rural State; Campbell County Memorial
Hospital v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573 (Wyo. 2014)
Sam Williams*
Introduction
Eighteen of the twenty-seven hospitals in Wyoming are governmental
entities.1 With a majority of the hospitals relying on funding from taxpayers,
courts in Wyoming are tasked with balancing the expenditure of public funds
and making parties injured by negligent care whole. Campbell County Memorial
Hospital v. Pfeifle forced the Wyoming Supreme Court to decide the scope of a
governmental hospital’s liability in a case of negligent care by an independent
contractor found to be an apparent agent.2
The injured patient was a pregnant woman who sought the obstetrician
services of Campbell County Memorial Hospital (CCMH), a district hospital
in Wyoming.3 In preparation for a cesarean section, the patient was improperly

* J.D. Candidate, University of Wyoming, 2016. I would like to thank Kyle Hendrickson,
Bailey Schreiber, Brianne Phillips, Professor Jerry Parkinson, and Dick Williams for the work they
put in and the input they provided in drafting this case note.
See Individual Hospital Profiles, AHA Data Viewer, available at http://www.ahadataviewer.
com/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (Click on “Get a Free Hospital Profile” hyperlink; then enter name
of hospital; select hospital; then click download). The governmental hospitals in the state at the time
of publication are:
1

1) Campbell County Memorial Hospital, Gillette; 2) Cheyenne Regional Hospital,
Cheyenne; 3) Crook County Memorial Hospital, Sundance; 4) Hot Springs
County Memorial Hospital, Thermopolis; 5) Ivinson Memorial Hospital, Laramie;
6) Johnson County Healthcare Center, Buffalo; 7) Memorial Hospital of Carbon
County, Rawlins; 8) Memorial Hospital of Converse County, Douglas; 9) Memorial
Hospital of Sweetwater County, Rock Springs; 10) Niobrara Health and Life Center,
Lusk; 11) North Big Horn Hospital, Lovell; 12) Sheridan Memorial Hospital,
Sheridan; 13) South Bighorn County Hospital, Basin; 14) South Lincoln Medical
Center, Kemmerer; 15) Star Valley Medical Center, Afton; 16) St. John’s Medical
Center, Jackson; 17) Weston County Health Services, Newcastle; 18) West Park
Hospital, Cody.
(Of the remaining nine hospitals, five are organized as nonprofits and the remaining four are
privately owned hospitals.) Id.
2

See Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573 (Wyo. 2014).

3

Id. at 575.
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administered spinal anesthesia three times by a registered nurse anesthetist
employed by Northern Plains Anesthesia Associates (Northern Plains).4 The
patient claimed CCMH was vicariously liable for the actions of the employee
of Northern Plains under the theory of apparent agency, due to the patient’s
justifiable reliance on the nurse’s care and skill and her reasonable belief that the
nurse was an employee of CCMH.5
Because CCMH is a governmental hospital, the patient brought suit pursuant
to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA).6 The patient claimed that
apparent agents fit the definition of “public employees” as defined by the WGCA;
therefore, the acts of apparent agents waived the defense of sovereign immunity.7
The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of the WGCA and
held that sovereign immunity had not been waived because the nurse was an
independent contractor.8
This case note starts with a discussion of traditional agency analysis and
the establishment of apparent agency in Wyoming, followed by an overview of
the WGCA.9 Next, the case note outlines the pertinent facts and how the court
applied the law in Pfeifle.10 This case note argues the court in Pfeifle incorrectly
held that the actions of apparent agents do not waive sovereign immunity.11 The
note also argues that the court properly interpreted the provisions of the WGCA
concerning independent contractors.12 It then argues the court should have held
that apparent agents fit the plain meaning of “public employee” in the WGCA,
which would qualify their actions as a waiver of sovereign immunity.13 The case
note concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of Pfeifle.14

Background
This section starts with a brief description of the unique nature of healthcare
in a predominately rural state such as Wyoming.15 It then provides Wyoming’s
approach to agency and the exception to the traditional employee/independent
4

Id.

5

Id. at 576; Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1988).

6

Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 575; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-13-101–21 (2014).

7

Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 576.

8

Id. at 580.

9

See infra notes 18–63 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 64–105 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 106– 08 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 109–17 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 118–39 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 140–48 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
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contractor dichotomy expressed in the theory of apparent agency.16 It ends with
an introduction to the sections of the WGCA relied on in Pfeifle.17

An Overview of the Healthcare Network in Wyoming
The Wyoming Department of Health, a statutorily created agency, plays
a significant role in Wyoming by compiling reports, allocating funding, and
organizing health initiatives at both governmental and private institutions in the
State.18 The department is comprised of a number of divisions and programs
including the Office of Rural Health.19 Some of the functions of the Office of
Rural Health include reporting on Health Professional Shortage Areas, which
every county in Wyoming is considered, and the management of the federal
Medicare Rural Hospital Flexibility Program (MRHFP).20
The goal of the MRHFP is “to ensure access to essential health care services
for rural residents by promoting rural health planning, network development,
regionalization of rural health services and improving access to hospital and other
health care services.”21 The MRHFP achieves these goals by allowing the state to
designate certain hospitals as Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs).22 The benefits of
the program for CAHs include exception from the Prospective Payment System,
Medicare reimbursement for 101 percent of their reasonable costs, eligibility
for CAH specific grants, and flexibility with staffing and hospital programs.23
These benefits ensure financial stability for rural hospitals that provide emergency
and limited inpatient healthcare to Medicaid eligible citizens.24 As a practical
consequence of protecting access to healthcare in rural areas, CAH’s also provides
a stable market place for independent contractors who provide essential services
to CAHs and operate under the same financial strains inherent in rural care.

16

See infra notes 25– 49 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 50– 63 and accompanying text.

18

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2005 (2014).

See About the Wyoming Department of Health, Wyoming Department of Health, available
at http://www.health.wyo.gov/main/about.html (last visited Jun. 2, 2014) (listing alphabetical divi
sions and programs of the Wyoming Department of Health).
19

20
See Wyoming Office of Rural Health Annual Report 2010, Wyoming Department of Health,
available at http://health.wyo.gov/rfhd/rural/orhpublications.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) [here
inafter Rural Health Annual Report]; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4 (2012).
21
Master Medicare Guide, 2014, §9.1 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business eds., 2014)
[hereinafter Master Medicare Guide].
22

42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4(c) (2012).

23

Rural Health Annual Report, supra note 20.

24

Master Medicare Guide, supra note 21.
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Independent Contractors vs. Employees under Wyoming Case Law
A common trait of most hospitals in Wyoming is employment of independent
contractors. In Wyoming, an employer’s right to control the details of an
individual’s work distinguishes independent contractors and employees.25 The
right of control is a question of fact for the jury, with an exception for cases where
only one reasonable inference can be drawn.26 This right of control inquiry creates
a dichotomy, as employees and independent contractors are “opposite sides of the
same coin; one cannot be both at the same time with respect to the same activity;
the one necessarily negatives the other, each depending on opposite answers to
the same right of control inquiry.”27 A set of factors helps the jury determine the
right of control when weighing the facts of the case.
The factors for a right of control analysis are: “the method of payment, the
right to terminate the relationship without incurring liability, the furnishing
of tools and equipment, the scope of the work, and the control of the premises
where the work is to be done.”28 Further, express contracts are important
indicators of an individual’s status, but are not dispositive proof that she is an
independent contractor.29
In theory, consideration of these factors should unequivocally delineate
which side of the employee/independent contractor dichotomy an individual falls
on. However, in cases where the proper result is not reached by applying the
strict dichotomy, the law in Wyoming recognizes the need for exceptions, such
as apparent agency and non-delegable duties.30 In the context of independent
contractors working on the premises of a hospital, the apparent agency exception
has been well developed.31

25

Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1042 (Wyo. 1978).

26

Id.

27

Coates v. Anderson, 84 P.3d 953, 957 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted).

Diamond B Services, Inc. v. Rohde, 120 P.3d 1031, 1041–42 (Wyo. 2005) (citing Stratman
v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 980 (1988); Sinclair, 584 P.2d at 1043).
28

29

Id. at 1041.

See Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1988) (adopting apparent agency for the actions
of pathologist independent contractor). See also Jones v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 896
(Wyo. 1986) (“‘. . . if the employer retains the right to direct the manner of the independent
contractor’s performance, or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety, the employer has
retained sufficient control to be held liable if he exercises that control negligently.’” (citation
omitted)).
30

See generally Steven E. Pegalis, 1 Am. Law Med. Malpractice, § 6:21 (2014) (discussing
cases in Washington, Michigan, California, and New York that discussed apparent agency in the
hospital liability context).
31
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Apparent Agency
Courts have frequently cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to establish the rule of apparent agency.32 The
Restatement (Second) of Agency defines apparent agency as:
“One who represents that another is his servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the
care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the
third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the
one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.”33
To trigger vicarious liability under this rule a principal must represent in some
way that an independent contractors is an agent.34 The injured party must also
justifiably rely on the apparent agent’s care or skill to some degree.35
The Restatement (Second) of Torts version of the rule does not have the
same reliance element.36 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the injured
party must accept the services of an independent contractor with the reasonable
belief that the contractor is an employee of the principal.37 These two theories can
intersect, because a person’s reasonable belief can be the basis of her reliance and
the belief is often induced by the representations of the principal.38 Because the
rules are intertwined, the choice of law in apparent agency tort claims is likely to
lead to the same result.39
The theory of apparent agency was first recognized as a theory of vicarious
liability for medical malpractice in Wyoming in Sharsmith v. Hill.40 In Sharsmith,
a patient sued multiple practitioners and St. John’s Hospital, a district hospital
in Jackson, for the improper diagnosis of a mass on her knee.41 Along with the

32
See Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law
(2d ed. 2014).
33

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1958).

34

Dobbs, supra note 32, § 433.

of

Torts § 433

35
Id. To what degree the third party must rely has caused a split in the courts, but in the
hospital context courts have found reliance in a “loose or attenuated sense” sufficient because it is
not likely that a patient receiving unforeseen medical care would change his mind upon learning of
the apparent agent’s actual status. Id.
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 669 (Wyo. 1988).

41

Id. at 668– 69.
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direct claim against St. John’s Hospital, the patient asserted a claim of vicarious
liability for the actions of two pathologists practicing at the hospital.42 The
district court granted St. John’s motion for summary judgment on the vicarious
liability claim, although the order did not contain a statement of the evidence or
the court’s reasoning.43
On appeal the patient in Sharsmith argued the circumstances surrounding
her injury warranted an exception to the traditional agency dichotomy.44 She
urged the court to adopt the apparent agency rule, “which imposes vicarious
liability against hospitals for the negligence of those practitioners who are the
ostensible or apparent agents of the hospital, regardless of whether they are employees
or independent contractors.”45 Finding the rationale behind the theory persuasive,
the court adopted the rule of apparent agency and held that in cases of treatment
by an independent contractor:
“Where a hospital holds itself out to the public as providing a
given service…and where the patient engages the services of the
hospital without regard to the identity of a particular physician
and where as a matter of fact the patient is relying upon the
hospital to deliver the desired health care and treatment, the
doctrine of respondeat superior applies and the hospital is
vicariously liable for damages proximately resulting from the
neglect, if any, of such physicians.”46
The court also cited both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Agency for
their respective definitions of apparent agency.47 Because of the interrelated
nature of the all the theories relied on in Sharsmith, later courts have applied the
apparent agency rule using both the elements of reliance on the part of the

42

Id.

43

Id. at 669.

44

Id. at 671–72.

45

Id. at 672 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Id. (quoting Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985)). The Wyoming Supreme
Court defined respondeat superior when it held, “[a]s a matter of public policy and economic
requirements a master is liable for damages caused by the negligence of his servant within the scope
of the latter’s employment.” Blessing v. Pittman, 251 P.2d 243, 246 (Wyo. 1952).
46

Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 672 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 (1965);
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1958)). Courts in Wyoming have not consistently relied
on one version of the rule. See Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass’n, 901 P.2d 381, 385 (Wyo.
1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1958)) (the court also discussed reasonable
belief in the context of a principal’s representation of the independent contractor’s status); Singer
v. New Tech Engr. L.P., 227 P.3d 305, 312 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 429 (1965)); Pfeifle v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 2012 WL 8429590 at 1 (No. 31854), rev’d,
317 P.3d 573 (2014) (the district court’s analysis relies primarily on the Restatement (Second) of
Agency section).
47

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss1/8

6

Williams: Tort Law - Who's Really Who: Apportioning Liability of Independen

2015

Case Note

217

injured party and his “reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by
the employer or by his servants.”48 In its adoption of the apparent agency, the
court did not discuss whether the actions of apparent agents waive sovereign
immunity, for which St. John’s qualified.49

Waiver of Immunity for Governmental Healthcare Providers under
the WGCA
Sovereign immunity for governmental entities prevails in Wyoming.50
However, an exception arises when negligent public employees act within the
scope of their employment.51 The need for exceptions to the rule of immunity
stems from the legislature’s recognition that strict application of the rule leads to
“inherently unfair and inequitable results.”52 In allowing liability, the legislature
also recognized its role as the “[trustee] of public revenues.”53 Therefore, by
enacting the WGCA, the legislature intended “to balance the respective equities
between persons injured by governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state
of Wyoming whose revenues are utilized by governmental entities on behalf of
those taxpayers.”54 Public hospitals, because of their prevalence in the state and
the potential for negligence claims, are a consistent point of friction between these
two considerations.55
The WGCA provides a section specifically for hospitals that qualify as
governmental entities.56 That section states: “A governmental entity is liable
48

Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 672 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 (1965)).

Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 580 (Wyo. 2014). The court in
Pfeifle speculated that because there is no mention of sovereign immunity in the pleadings in
Sharsmith, “[it appeared] that St. John’s Hospital may have waived sovereign immunity by not
raising the affirmative defense.” Id. at 580 n.3.
49

50

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) (2014).

51

Id.

52

Id. § 1-39-102(a). The section reads in part:
The Wyoming legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which
occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity. . . . It is further
recognized that the state and its political subdivisions as trustees of public revenues
are constituted to serve the inhabitants of the state of Wyoming and furnish certain services
not available through private parties and, in the case of the state, state revenues may only
be expended upon legislative appropriation. This act is adopted by the legislature to
balance the respective equities between persons injured by governmental actions and
the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming whose revenues are utilized by governmental
entities on behalf of those taxpayers. . . .

Id. (emphasis added).
53

Id.

54

Id.

55

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

56

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-109 (2014).
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for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage
caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their
duties in the operation of any public hospital or in providing public outpatient
health care.”57 Another section of the WGCA pertains specifically to health care
providers and imposes liability on “health care providers who are employees of
the governmental entity.”58 The providers under this section include contract
physicians who are employed at state institutions and county jails.59
A commonly litigated phrase in the application of the WGCA is “public
employees.”60 Public employees are defined as “any officer, employee or servant
of a governmental entity, including elected or appointed officials, peace officers
and persons acting on behalf or in service of a governmental entity in any
official capacity, whether with or without compensation.”61 However, physician
independent contractors are specifically excluded from this definition, unless
they are engaged in providing “contract services for state institutions or county
jails.”62 This definition relies on the traditional employee/independent contractor
dichotomy of agency law, but it is not clear where apparent agents fit. The
negligent acts of nurse anesthetist Amanda Phillips (Nurse Phillips), while acting
as an apparent agent of Campbell County Memorial Hospital, provided the
Wyoming Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify how apparent agents fit
the definitions used in the WGCA.63

Principal Case
Background
On September 24, 2008, Jaime Pfeifle was admitted to CCMH for labor
inducement.64 Upon admission, the attending obstetrician informed Pfeifle that
a cesarean section would be required to deliver her child.65 In preparation for
surgery, Nurse Phillips, an employee of Northern Plains Anesthesia Associates,
prepared and attempted to administer spinal anesthesia three times.66 As a result

57

Id. (emphasis added).

58

Id. § 1-39-110(a).

59

Id.

See e.g. Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1989); Milton v. Mitchell, 762
P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1988); Veile v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Washakie Cnty., 860 P.2d 1174 (Wyo.
1993); Cline v. Dep’t. Family Servs., 927 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1996).
60

61

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(A) (2014).

62

Id. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(C).

63

Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 580 (Wyo. 2014).

64

Id. at 575.

65

Id.

66

Id.
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of improper administration of the anesthesia, Mrs. Pfeifle suffered permanent
disability.67 In order to bring a cause of action for her injuries based on apparent
agency, Mrs. Pfeifle noted her justifiable reliance on the skill and care of Nurse
Phillips and her reasonable belief that Nurse Phillips was an agent of CCMH.68
A number of circumstances formed Mrs. Pfeifle’s reasonable belief that
Nurse Phillips was an agent of CCMH. For example, prior to the administration
of spinal anesthesia, Mrs. Pfeifle was not informed of who would perform the
complex anesthesia procedure.69 Consequently, Mrs. Pfeifle was not involved in
the decision to have Nurse Phillips administer the anesthesia without the oversight
of an attending doctor or other support staff. 70 Nurse Phillips also did not to
inform Mrs. Pfeifle of her status as an independent contractor, in contradiction
of CCMH’s general procedure policy.71 The only information presented to Mrs.
Pfeifle was a consent form with only CCMH’s name and address on it.72 The
space provided to identify the anesthesia provider was left blank.73
Beyond the failure to expressly inform Mrs. Pfeifle of Nurse Phillip’s
employment status, there were other factors that led Mrs. Pfeifle to believe
the anesthesia services were provided by CCMH. The failed procedures were
undertaken on the campus of CCMH, which held itself out as a provider of
obstetrician services.74 The necessary equipment and supplies were provided
by CCMH.75 CCMH also provided support staff for the anesthesiologists and
assigned the required work per the medical director’s call schedule.76 Mrs. Pfeifle’s
apparent agency claim relied on the totality of these circumstances to support her
case against CCMH for the negligent acts of Nurse Phillips.77
In the district court, CCMH moved for summary judgment of the claims
based on vicarious liability for Nurse Philips.78 The Supreme Court of Wyoming
had not addressed the issue of whether the apparent agency rule, as announced in

67

Id.

68

Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 672 (Wyo. 1988).

Brief for Appellees at 3, Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573 (Wyo. 2014)
(No. S-13-0040), 2013 WL 4104012 at *2.
69

70

Id. at 4, 2013 WL 4104012 at *3.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 4–5, 2013 WL 4104012 at *3.

74

Id. at 3–4, 2013 WL 4104012 at *2–3.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 23–24, 2013 WL 4104012 at *22–23.

Pfeifle v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 2012 WL 8429590 at 1 (No. 31854), rev’d, 317
P.3d 573 (2014).
78
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Sharsmith, applied to governmental hospitals on a previous appeal.79 Because the
question was central to CCMH’s motion for summary judgment, it was directed
to the district court.80
The district court held that the apparent agency rule did apply because the
hospital in Sharsmith was also a governmental entity, and the patient’s expectations,
which serve as the basis for the rule, are the same regardless of whether the hospital
is a governmental entity or not.81 The district court then broke down Sharsmith’s
holding into four factors:
1. The hospital holds itself out to the public as providing a
given service.
2. The hospital enters into a contractual agreement with one
or more physicians to direct and provide the service.
3. The patient engages the services of the hospital without
regard to the identity of a particular physician.
4. The patient is relying upon the hospital to deliver the desired
health care and treatment.82
The court held that the factors were satisfied because Mrs. Pfeifle sought CCMH’s
services based solely on her need for the safe delivery of her child.83 She did not
anticipate having to undergo anesthesia, but she deferred to the judgment of
the obstetrician and consented to the pre-operative procedure under the reasonable
belief that it would be provided by the entity that represented itself as a provider
of such services.84 Under these circumstances the court held Nurse Phillips was
an apparent agent of CCMH, and therefore, vicariously liable for her actions.85

The Majority Decision
The Wyoming Supreme Court took a more critical look at the WGCA and
ultimately held that governmental hospitals are not vicariously liable for the
actions of apparent agents.86 The court’s analysis starts with a brief history of the

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id. (citations omitted).

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 1–2.

86

Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 580 (Wyo. 2014).
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time-honored doctrine of sovereign immunity.87 A pervasive theme of this initial
analysis is a high degree of judicial deference because “the right to seek redress
for [wrongs committed by the state] is determined by the policy and will of the
legislative body.”88 The court also cited the purpose of the WGCA as expressed by
the legislature itself, which the court would later rely to reach its conclusion.89 The
final step the court took to solidify this idea of judicial deference was to emphasize
the court’s consistent holding that the WGCA is a “close ended” tort claims act.90
After introducing the concepts of sovereign immunity and judicial deference,
the court turned its focus to Sections 109 and 110 of the WGCA, which deal
with healthcare supplied at governmental hospitals.91 In construing the respective
statutes the court relied on the plain meaning of the words used and attempted
to construe the sections of the Act as a whole.92 The court held the section of
the Act that defined of public of employee as “any officer, employee or servant
of a governmental entity… acting on behalf or in the service of a governmental
entity,” applies to both sections of the WGCA that reference healthcare workers.93
The court then held the following subsections expressly exclude independent
contractors from the definition.94 Following these holdings, the court then applied
its interpretation to the facts of the case.95

87

See Id. at 578.

88

Id.

89

Id.; see supra note 52.

Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 579 (citing Sawyer v. Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 1990);
Torrington v. Cottier, 145 P.3d 1274, 1277 (Wyo. 2006); Dept. of Corr. v. Watts, 177 P.3d 793,
796–97 (Wyo. 2008); Weber v. State, 261 P.3d 225, 227 (Wyo. 2011); DiFelici v. City of Lander,
312 P.3d 816, 819 (Wyo. 2013)). The court has defined “close ended” as meaning “unless a claim
asserted against a municipality falls within one of the statutory exceptions, it will be barred.” Boehm
v. Cody Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 709 (Wyo. 1987).
90

91

Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 579.

Id.; see also Stroth v. N. Lincoln Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 327 P.3d 121, 125 (Wyo. 2014) (holding
“when we interpret statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and we ‘attempt
to determine the legislature’s intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words
used in the statute.’”) (citation omitted).
92

93

Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 579 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(A) (2014)).

94

Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 579. The subsections state the term “public employee”:
(B) Does not include an independent contractor, except as provided in
subparagraphs (C) and (F) of this paragraph, or a judicial officer exercising the
authority vested in him;
(C) Includes contract physicians, physician assistants, nurses, optometrists and
dentists in the course of providing contract services for state institutions or
county jails;

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(B–C) (2014).
95

Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 580.
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Based on the district court’s assumption that Nurse Phillips was an employee
of Northern Plains, the Wyoming Supreme Court held she was an independent
contractor.96 Therefore, because neither of the two exceptions for independent
contractor liability applied, i.e. independent contractors who provide services to
state institutions or county jails, Nurse Phillips’s actions did not qualify as a waiver
of immunity under the WGCA.97 The court then made a point to address the
district court’s conclusion that the holding in Sharsmith applies to all hospitals.98
The district court relied on the fact that the hospital in Sharsmith was a
governmental hospital to conclude the apparent agency rule applies to all hospitals
equally.99 The Wyoming Supreme Court noted the district court’s assumption
attempted to create an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity based on Sharsmith’s
silence on the issue.100 Because Sharsmith did not discuss whether the legislature
intended the actions of apparent agents to act as a waiver of immunity, the court
held a waiver had not been established.101 Instead, the court deferred to the
legislature by holding that if the legislature had intended the actions of apparent
agents to constitute a waiver it could have expressly done so.102 The court also
reasoned that redress for the victim, the inherent goal of both the WGCA and
the apparent agency rule, was available to Mrs. Pfeifle because she could bring
suit against Northern Plains as a private entity for the actions of Nurse Phillips.103
Because of these conclusions, the court declined to expand liability under the
WGCA to the facts of the case.104 The case was reversed and the remaining claims
were remanded.105

Analysis
The Wyoming Supreme Court erred in its interpretation of the WGCA
when it held that the actions of apparent agents do not constitute a waiver
of sovereign immunity. First, the court should have found apparent agents fit
the plain meaning of “public employees” under the WGCA by relying on the
reasonable belief of Mrs. Pfeifle that Nurse Phillips was an employee of the
hospital. 106 Second, by holding actions of apparent agents constitute a waiver of
96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 580 n.2.

104
105
106

Id. at 580.
Id.
See infra notes 118–38 and accompanying text.
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immunity, the court could have upheld the policy behind the apparent agency
rule of making an injured party who seeks the services of a hospital whole.107
Third, this holding would treat equally all hospitals that make up the network
of essential healthcare services in rural areas, as opposed to leaving non-profit
and private hospitals responsible for upholding the policy behind the apparent
agency rule.108

Statutory Interpretation of WGCA Concerning Independent Contractors
The court in Pfeifle properly held that the actions of independent contractors
generally do not waive immunity, however its analysis overlooked key phrases in
the statute that apply to apparent agents. The court had a well-established line
of precedent to rely upon when interpreting the WGCA.109 Since its adoption
in 1979, every court has held the WGCA is a close-ended tort claims act.110 As a
close-ended act, the WGCA “generally grants immunity to governmental entities
and public employees, waiving that immunity only through specific statutory
exceptions.”111 To delineate these exceptions the starting point of interpretation
of the WGCA is an examination of the ordinary meaning of the words used in the
context of the statute as a whole.112
The statutory provisions key to the court’s holding were the subsections
under the definition of “public employee.”113 The subsections lend themselves to
a plain reading:
(iv) “Public employee”:
(A) Means any officer, employee or servant of a governmental
entity, including elected or appointed officials, peace
officers and persons acting on behalf or in service of a
governmental entity in any official capacity, whether with
or without compensation;
(B) Does not include an independent contractor, except
as provided in subparagraphs (C) and (F) of this paragraph, or a judicial officer exercising the authority
vested in him;

107

See infra notes 139–48 and accompanying text.

108

See infra notes 139– 48 and accompanying text.

109

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

110

Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 579 (Wyo. 2014).

111

DiFelici v. City of Lander, 312 P.3d 816, 819 (Wyo. 2013) (citations omitted).

112

Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 331 P.3d 1174, 1178 (Wyo. 2014).

113

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(A–C) (2014).
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(C) Includes contract physicians, physician assistants,
nurses, optometrists and dentists in the course of
providing contract services for state institutions or
county jails;114
The subsections clearly distinguish between employees and independent con
tractors, with independent contractors expressly excluded from the definition.115
The court in Pfeifle correctly noted that the district court accepted the
factual conclusion that Nurse Phillips was not an actual employee of CCMH.116
From this premise the court was able to hold that, as an independent contractor,
Nurse Phillips’s actions were specifically excluded as a waiver of immunity under
the plain meaning of the statute.117 However, applying the strict dichotomy of
employee or independent contractor undermines the purpose of the apparent
agency rule announced in Sharsmith. Applying the employee/independent
contractor dichotomy ignores the possibility that independent contractors who
meet the rule under Sharsmith fit the definition of “persons acting on behalf or
in service of a governmental entity in any official capacity.” 118 An examination
of the claim at issue in Pfeifle will show how the actions of apparent agent fit the
statutory definition of public employee in the WGCA.

How the Apparent Agent’s Actions in Pfeifle Fit the WGCA
Mrs. Pfeifle had a strong case for claiming CCHM was vicariously liable
for Nurse Phillips under the theory of apparent agency. The circumstances
surrounding Mrs. Pfeifle’s admittance to CCMH shows her belief that Nurse
Phillips was an employee of CCMH was reasonable.119 Mrs. Pfeifle sought the
services of CCMH expecting labor to be induced, but ultimately consented to a
cesarean section.120 She was unable to discuss the details concerning the anesthesia
services provided at the hospital, which would have been clarified if Nurse Phillips

114
Id. (emphasis added). The definition of public employees also includes contract attorneys
providing services for the Office of the State Public Defender. Id. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(F).
115
Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 579 (Wyo. 2014) (“The definition
[of public employee] is restricted by the second subparagraph (‘[d]oes not include an independent
contractor, except as provided in subparagraph[ ] (C)’)”) (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)
(iv)(C) (2014)); Cline v. Dept. of Family Servs., 927 P.2d 261, 263 (Wyo. 1996) (holding “[t]he
term [public employee] does not include an independent contractor except contract physicians in
specified circumstances.”).
116

Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 577.

117

Id. at 580.

118

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(A) (2014).

119

See supra notes 64 –77 and accompanying text.

120

Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 575 (Wyo. 2014).
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informed Mrs. Pfeifle that she was not affiliated with CCMH.121 Because Mrs.
Pfeifle had no indication that she was not still under the care of the hospital staff,
she could only assume the procedure would be provided by the hospital whose
services she initially sought.122
For Mrs. Pfeifle’s apparent agency claim against CCMH to survive, the
operative question was whether Mrs. Pfeifle’s reasonable belief that Nurse Phillips
was an agent of CCMH was enough to satisfy the definition of public employee
under the WGCA. As far as Mrs. Pfeifle was concerned, Nurse Phillips was a
“person acting on behalf or in service of a governmental entity in [an] official
capacity,” the WGCA’s definition of public employee .123 This fact underscores an
important part of the district court’s reasoning the Supreme Court of Wyoming
failed to consider. Namely, the district court recognized the patient’s reasonable
belief and expectation of services are the same regardless of whether the hospital
is a governmental entity or not, therefore her right to bring suit should remain
intact.124 The Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed a patient’s right to be made
whole by noting Mrs. Pfeifle retained the right to bring suit against the private
entity that employed Nurse Phillips.125 Because Mrs. Pfeifle was not denied redress
for her injuries, the inequities that prompted the WGCA were not implicated.126
However, the court’s holding diminished the policy behind the apparent agency
rule aimed at making a person whole.127 The court could have avoided the result
of its holding by incorporating a considered analysis of the apparent agency rule
in it interpretation of the WGCA.
Because the court in Pfeifle did not rely on the belief and expectation of service
of Mrs. Pfeifle in classifying Nurse Phillips, it was restricted in its interpretation
of the WGCA by the “two-sides of the same coin” dichotomy.128 The issue with
the court’s reliance on this reasoning is that apparent agency, an exception to
the traditional right of control analysis, renders the strict differentiation between
employees and independent contractors a false dichotomy.129 Although Wyoming
precedent suggests an individual “cannot be both [an independent contractor

121
Brief for Appellees at 3, Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573 (Wyo. 2014)
(No. S-13-0040), 2013 WL 4104012 at *2.
122

See supra notes 64–77 and accompanying text.

123

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(A) (2014).

See Pfeifle v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 2012 WL 8429590 at 1 (No. 31854), rev’d, 317
P.3d 573 (2014).
124

125

Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 580 n.2 (Wyo. 2014).

126

Id.

127

See infra notes 140– 43 and accompanying text.

128

Coates v. Anderson, 84 P.3d 953, 957 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted).

129

See 6 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 457 § 1 (1989).
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and employee] at the same time with respect to the same activity,” the apparent
agency rule’s practical outcome in terms of vicarious liability is the opposite.130
A plaintiff can use the theory of apparent agency to effectively circumvent the
right of control inquiry and create an agency relationship that would otherwise
not exist under the traditional dichotomy.131 The holding in Pfeifle protects
governmental hospitals from claims that bypass the independent contractor
defense. In contrast, private and nonprofit hospitals are still exposed to the
liability that results from the contradiction of traditional agency law presented by
apparent agency.132
The contradiction created by apparent agency is not directly addressed in
any Wyoming precedent. The theoretical underpinnings of the apparent agency
rule clarify what sort of agency relationship is created by the rule.133 Again, the
apparent agency rule creates an agency relationship that would otherwise not
exist.134 One way to define this relationship is to find the independent contractor
is an agent of the apparent principal, which would make the apparent principal
liable under the general rule of agency liability.135 What creates this relationship is
a third party’s perception of the agent in question.136
As applied to Pfeifle, the question, again, is whether or not apparent agency
modifies the status of an individual enough to fit the statutory definition of
“public employee.” The court in Pfeifle could have found a waiver of immunity for
apparent agents if, instead of adhering to the independent contractor/employee
dichotomy, it recognized the apparent agency rule modified the status of Nurse
Phillips.137 If the court had focused on the language in the statute that says a
public employee is, “any person acting on behalf or in service of a governmental
entity in [an] official capacity,” it could have relied on Mrs. Pfeifle’s reasonable
belief that Nurse Phillips was an agent acting on behalf of the governmental entity,

130

Coates, 84 P.3d at 957; supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.

131

See 6 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 457 § 1 (1989).

132

Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 580 (Wyo. 2014).

See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1958); Restatement (Second)
§ 429 (1965); 6 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 457 § 1 (1989).
133

134

of

Torts

6 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 457 § 1 (1989).

Id. See also Gamble v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 438, 441 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (noting that
the Federal Government waived its sovereign immunity and was equitably estopped from claiming
anesthesiologist was not an employee because VA hospital had created appearance of agency).
135

136

See 6 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 457 § 1 (1989).
The doctrine of ostensible agency is a concept that focuses not on the actual relation of
the ostensible principal and tortfeasor but on the ostensible or apparent relationship.
Actual agency arises from a principal’s communication to its agent; ostensible agency
arises from what an ostensible principal’s behavior communicates to a third party.

137

See supra notes 128, 134–36 and accompanying text.
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the apparent principal, and extended the waiver of immunity to her as an
apparent agent.138
Instead, the court in Pfeifle effectively rendered the holding in Sharsmith
hollow, as applied to hospitals, without overruling it.139 The result is the selective
application of the strict dichotomy of independent contractor and employee in
vicarious liability situations concerning hospitals. Because only governmental
hospitals receive the benefit of this strict dichotomy, nonprofit and private hospitals
are unjustly left to uphold the policy behind the apparent agency rule. This
unjust result implicates various policy concerns regarding the non-governmental
hospitals that are an essential part of Wyoming’s rural healthcare network.

Policy in Pfeifle
The court in Pfeifle seemingly attempted to uphold the policy in favor of
protecting hospitals that provide essential care in Wyoming. However in doing
so, it hindered the policy goal of making a patient whole and overlooked the
unjust result on non-profit and private hospitals. The closest the court comes to
justifying the result is its emphasis on the fact that governmental hospitals require
the expenditure of public funds.140 Considering, in the last decade, there were
62.31 million dollars in medical malpractice payments in Wyoming, the court’s
policy of protecting public funds is not unfounded.141
Despite the court’s valid policy argument for protecting public funds, there is
a stronger policy argument, which is embodied by both the WGCA and apparent
agency, for making an injured party whole when they seek the services of a
hospital.142 The growing policy preference for making the injured party whole

138

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(A) (2014).

139

See Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573, 580 (Wyo. 2014).

140

See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.

NPDB Research Statistics, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, available
at http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbstats/npdbStatistics.jsp#ContentTop (last visited Nov.
8, 2014).
141

See generally Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Wis. 1992); Simmons v. Tuomey
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2000); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d
970, 974 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); J. Stuart Showalter, The Law of Healthcare Administration,
126–27 (4th ed. 2004); Martin C. McWilliams Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell III, Hospital Liability
for Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 431, 473 (1996); Gregory T. Perkes,
Medical Malpractice—Ostensible Agency and Corporate Negligence—Hospital Liability May be Based on
Either Doctrine of Ostensible Agency or Doctrine of Corporate Negligence: Brownsville Medical Center
and Valley Community v. Gracia, 17 St. Mary’s L. J. 551, 573 (1986); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 1-39-102(a) (2014) (“The Wyoming legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable
results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity.”)
142
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is shown in instances such as hospital insurance plans including, like CCMH’s
did, language that extends coverage to independent contractors.143 Because of the
ruling in Pfeifle, non-governmental hospitals, many of which are the sole providers
of essential services in rural communities, are now unequally responsible for
upholding this policy preference.
A final policy argument, not addressed in Sharsmith or Pfeifle, is that the
apparent agency rule is harmful to the healthcare system as a whole.144 This
policy argument is based on the idea that apparent agency leads to increased
insurance costs and more medical malpractice claims, which will raise the cost
of health care.145 One possible solution, which the Pfeifle court almost embraced
by rendering the apparent agency rule hollow, is to abandon apparent agency.146
However, the court in Pfeifle did not abandon the rule.147 Since the apparent
agency rule is still in force in Wyoming for non-governmental hospitals, the
second best solution to rising health care costs is for the court to meaningfully
reexamine the structure of the rule, which the Pfeifle court failed to do.148

Conclusion
The purpose of apparent agency is to bypass the traditional “two sides of the
same coin” approach to determining the status of workers in order to make the
injured party whole.149 Reconciling apparent agency with the WGCA serves the
purposes of both the rule and the statute.150 The court in Pfeifle should have held
the agency relationship created by a third party’s reasonable belief fit the plain

Brief for Appellees at 8–10, Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573 (Wyo.
2014) (No. S-13-0040), 2013 WL 4104012 at *7–9.
143

See Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358, 374 (Miss. 1985) (Lee, J., dissenting in part
concurring in part). A dissenting opinion in the case relied on by Sharsmith to establish the apparent
agency rule noted “[t]he majority’s decision to impose liability on a hospital for the negligent actions
of a physician independent contractor is certain to have a negative impact in terms of health care
costs and availability.” Id.
144

145

Perkes, supra note 142.

146

See supra note 139 and accompanying text.

See supra note 139 and accompanying text. See also Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle,
317 P.3d 573, 577, 580 (Wyo. 2014).
147

148
See Pfeifle, 317 P.3d at 577 and 580; Martin C. McWilliams Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell III,
Hospital Liability for Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 431, 445–52 (1996);
Adam Alstott, Hospital Liability for Negligence of Independent Contractor Physicians Under Principles
of Apparent Agency, 25 J. Legal Med. 485 (2004).
149

See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.

150

See supra notes 52, 142 and accompanying text.
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meaning of “public employees” in the WGCA.151 This holding would have waived
sovereign immunity for governmental hospitals for the actions of apparent agents
and allowed injured parties to recover for negligent treatment at any one of the
eighteen governmental hospitals in the state.152 In failing to hold that actions of
apparent agent as waivers of immunity, the court in Pfeifle left the other essential
healthcare facilities in the state unequally exposed to this growing form of liability.

151

See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.

152

See supra notes 1, 136 –39 and accompanying text.
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